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Defense Acquisition University 
Background Current state of the DoD—Cyber Shock
“Our adversaries and strategic 
competitors will increasingly use cyber 
capabilities—including cyber espionage, 
attack, and influence—to seek political, 
economic, and military advantage over 
the United States and its allies and 
partners.” (p. 5) 
Background Environmental Scan—DoN Readiness
“To restate, the DON culture, processes, structure, 
and resources are ill-suited for this new era. The 
culture is characterized by a lack of
understanding and appreciation of the threats, and 
inability to anticipate them, and a responsive
checklist behavior that values compliance over 
outcomes, antiquated processes and governance 
structures that are late to respond to dynamic 
threats, and an enterprise whose resources are
consumed by force structure and platforms that 
deprive the information systems and capabilities
required for warfighting and defense in this 
environment. The net-net is that the DON is
preparing to fight tomorrow’s kinetic war, which 
may or may not come, while losing the global
cyber enabled information war.” (p. 7)
Background Environmental Scan—DoN Readiness
“Whereas the private sector has acknowledged the 
existentiality of the cyber threat and pivoted 
aggressively towards technology being core to 
their business success, the DON has yet
to do the same in a meaningful way. … Despite 
these initiatives, the progress made to date in 
changing DON’s information resilience and 
cybersecurity culture has been insufficient to bring 
about meaningful change. A real appreciation of 
the cyber threat continues to be absent from the 
fabric of DON culture. Senior leaders occasionally 
articulate the importance of cybersecurity, but do 
not fully understand how to convert their words into 
action, and to making it real.” (p. 12)
Background Environmental Scan—DoD is at Risk
Managing Cybersecurity Risk
“However, the DoD needs to continue focusing
on managing cybersecurity risks related to 
governance, asset management, information 
protection processes and procedures, identity 
management and access control, security 
continuous monitoring, detection processes, and 
communications. The largest number of 
weaknesses identified in this year’s summary were 
related to governance, which allows an 
organization to inform its management of 
cybersecurity risk through the policies, procedures, 
and processes to manage and monitor the 
organizations regulatory, legal, risk, environmental, 
and operational requirements.” (p. ii)
Framing
Assumptions
• Cybersecurity is a decaying function— static cybersecurity assures a declining
security posture 
• NO SYSTEM is without malware — every system has an inherent vulnerability
that is just waiting to be exploited
• People over rely on the technology for security and don’t sufficiently consider
the people and process components
• The seemingly most secure system often fails to acknowledge that it can be
affected by a higher level threat (e.g. any system can be misconfigured)
• Cybersecurity Policy stands at the Outcome level; Acquisition guidance and implementation below the outcome 
level is subjective (i.e. “Design for the Fight” is an example of an Outcome Level)
• Most programs undershoot “adequate security” —most operate under a false sense of security until they discover 
they did not sufficiently manage realistic and likely operational risks
• DoD may not be proactive enough to exploit its own systems to withstand advanced threats 
- Example.  Netflix: champion of self-imposed chaos. They developed Chaos Monkey in 2011 to test the 
resiliency of their IT infrastructure. The tool works by intentionally disabling computers in Netflix's production 
network to test how remaining systems respond to outages.
+ 1 New Framing
Assumption
Cybersecurity Must be Viewed as a Dilemma Instead of a Problem
Solving a Problem Managing a Dilemma
Security in the Middle EastFixing a Broken Car
Test Data
• “DOD missions and systems remain at risk from adversarial 
cyber operations. Operational tests continued to discover 
mission-critical vulnerabilities in acquisition programs,…”
• “Recent advances in cyber technologies indicate that automation 
– and even artificial intelligence – are beginning to make 
profound changes to the cyber domain. Warfighters and network 
defenders must prepare for the onslaught of multi-pronged cyber-
attacks across both critical mission systems and the multitude of 
supporting systems and networks that enable these missions…”
• ”DOT&E performed an assessment of a major command which 
identified several vulnerabilities that could impact mission 
assurance. Senior leadership at the command self-reported to 
senior DOD leadership that the command’s mission assurance 
posture was potentially degraded, and made mitigation of these 
vulnerabilities a top priority.”
• “Test and assessments in FY18 again found that low-capability 




Problem Statement.  What we found:  In support of DoD’s cybersecurity 
strategy and policy, Program offices are solving specific instances of their 
problems and dismissing daily Cybersecurity Risk Management.
Discovery: After conducting over 70+ Cybersecurity workshops with 
various DoD customers and learning their competencies, it is abundantly 
clear their behaviors need to change to support security management 
and security engineering practices in order to achieve Cybersecurity 
imperatives…or lose to an evolving cyber threat.  
Goal: Implementing a robust, effective, and sustainable Cybersecurity 
Program requires a long-term and ongoing commitment. 
Research Tools
New World Kirkpatrick® Model: Kirkpatrick learning Levels. 
Adapted from “Four Levels of Training and Evaluation.”
Logic Model
Research Tools
Herman Ebbinghaus’ Forgetting Curve
80% of what we learn we forget in 30 days if there is no reinforcement
The more relevant the training, the better the recall: R = e^(-t/s)
Case Study
Workshop Outcomes
• Determine program cybersecurity 
requirements and mission objectives
• Employ cybersecurity engineering oversight 
to assess DoD security posture and cyber 
hygiene implementation
• Apply best practices in cybersecurity risk 
management to their projects 
• Reinforce behaviors to overcome the 
Forgetting Curve 
• Follow-up after workshops to monitor 





Construct a comprehensive and holistic 
system view while addressing stakeholder 
security and risk concerns
Apply learning across AoAs, requirements, 
engineering, and risk trade-off analyses to 
achieve a cost-effective security architectural 
design for protections that enable 
mission/business success; and 
Evaluate the effectiveness and suitability of 
the security elements of the system as an 




• Figure summarizes what nineteen 
respondents had to say about their 
level II learning levels “before and 
after” after the workshop. 
• Noticeable shifts and distinctions 
from this highly interactive and 
“hands on” event in each learning 
category without exceptions.
• Domain 2 had the most significant 
shift where the respondents no 
longer needed assistance after the 
workshop.  
• Domains 1 and 2 virtually 
eliminated their lack of 











Basic  Understanding 
but cannot perform
















Note:  Using an Anova Test for a comparison of the Means & Standard Deviations of the “Before” & “After” 
values of Attitudes on the Behaviors by Domain.
In all 5 domains, we can reject the Null Hypothesis that “the training had no effect on the Auditor’s attitude 
for the behaviors.”  We accept the Alternate Hypothesis, “the training has a statistically significant effect on 
attitudes towards the behaviors.” 
*ISACA (Information Systems Audit and Control Association—110,000 strong in 180 countries)











• Right now, as a novice, I would say my biggest challenges are ensuring I have a full and complete 
understanding of all the components, and having a clear vision of putting all this into play … 
• The biggest challenge is simply a matter of scope vs. resources. We all face this of course, so finding time to 
keep momentum requires focus that is sometimes difficult. 
• I was impressed that the training was compressed into two days. So much material was covered! … I think 
that improvement will come from continuing the activity so it is not a one and done …
• This workshop helped me better understand the requirements and how to convey that importance to our 
customers … 
• When looking at the security posture of an asset, I will now ask the questions to determine what the priority 
result is for this asset and then look at the systems needed to attain that goal / result. … 
• I'm standing up a lab for a new C2P effort … It is aimed at replacing the legacy C2P over the next decade. I 
expect to apply the techniques learned in this workshop during our IPTs …
• This course has made me more important as a resource to others around me … Already, leaving the class, was 




Interest in Cyber Profession …
• I am a systems administrator but am looking to make cyber my focus so currently looking at all the options available to me to 
make the switch.
• This week, I have attended your workshops. I am very interested in an educational path that will ultimately end up in a 
professional career in Cyber Security. Do you have any recommendations on how to start in the field? 
Working with Teams to make a Difference …
• I wanted to reach out and say thank you for the relevant class last week.  I got a lot out of it.  I'm the guy in the back that asked all 
the questions and stumped you on the RFI GFI question….I appreciate your patience with my questions.  It will be a team effort 
to look at how we do things and change course where we need to do better.  Your class was a great tool to help me do this.  I 
recommended it to my team. 
• I want to exercise the strategies that my xxxxx team is coming up with for the maturity model against what I learned last week. It 
will provide cyber engineering experiential learning for the xxx team, reinforce recently acquired knowledge through application
for me, and get eye to eye conversations going between entities (e.g., HSI, SE, CE, IT, PM) that otherwise may not interact first 
person during initial concepts of strategic planning. 
• I am getting a lot out of the workshop and am planning to work with the Divisions and IPTs within the Department to schedule 
them for this workshop. … The SECNAV report is simply documenting a severe lack of leadership attention to a critical area. We 
have placed our Navy in a precarious position of not having a capability in dealing with two of our fieriest adversaries. 
Qualitative Comments 
The Why, 
What, and HowResearch Tools
The Why: Cybersecurity is fast becoming the single biggest 
threat to our National Security in the 21st century
What can you do? How can you do it?
Frequently test your cybersecurity knowledge through… …The application, verification, and evidence of the 
critical learning behaviors demonstrated
Embody the learning accelerators and reduce the learning 
inhibitors through…
…Challenging work, practice…and recognize the risks 
associated with the forgetting curve…
Access all cybersecurity learning assets through… …Publications, workshops, job aids, mentors….   
Build your cybersecurity learning plan by your… …IDP, self-education, and participation in communities 
of practice… 
Understanding your role in the cybersecurity domain and 
determine your… 
…Responsibilities, ownership, accountability…














Part 1 & 2
Findings
• The DoD still has significant cybersecurity issues with Significant Mission Impacts
• Cybersecurity is a complex, dynamic and ambiguous domain and requires treatment as a 
dilemma instead of as a problem
• Cybersecurity KSAs exist (e.g. NIST SP 800-181) but are only sporadically translated into 
behaviors
• The forgetting curve is in full effect: cybersecurity requires an on-going customer commitment 
and interaction before critical behaviors can influence outcomes
• Formal (and tailored) training is the starting point. What
the workforce applies in the workplace after the learning is more critical
• Commitment to customer outcomes requires on-going interaction
• Reinforcement of the behaviors is dependent on organizational




Herman Ebbinghaus’ Forgetting Curve
80% of what we learn we forget in 30
days if there is no reinforcement
The more relevant the training, 
the better the recall 
R = e^(-t/s)
Research Tools
Levels 3 and 4
• The data substantiates the 
training effectiveness
• Measures on-the-job 
performance and accompanying 
behavioral changes due to 
training and reinforcement
• Affords the evidence that 
organizations would expect to 
see from their investment  
Training effectiveness data is key to demonstrating the value that the training has 
contributed to the organization…and that stakeholders find valuable.”
New World Kirkpatrick® Model: Kirkpatrick learning Levels. Adapted from “Four Levels of Training and Evaluation.”
